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With a few narrow exceptions, U.S. patent law concerns itself with 
activity that either occurs within this country’s borders or crosses its 
borders. In the typical case, that means that a patentee can recover lost 
profits or reasonable royalties based on the domestic sales of infringing 
products. However, patentees have begun to successfully advance a new 
and creative approach that this Essay labels the “worldwide causation” 
theory. So long as some domestic infringement can be said to cause sales 
overseas, patentees argue that there should be no territorial limitation on 
their recovery, allowing recovery for damages suffered anywhere in the 
world. 
This Essay argues that courts should reject this new theory on both 
doctrinal and policy grounds. Part I introduces the worldwide causation 
theory in the context of patent law principles. Part II contends that, as a 
purely doctrinal matter, permitting patentees to recover damages for sales 
that take place overseas would circumvent the explicit territorial limitations 
that are well established in U.S. patent law. This argument is reinforced by 
the general presumption against the extraterritorial application of any U.S. 
law. 
Part III discusses why the worldwide causation theory of damages also 
makes bad international and domestic policy. Under the current 
international regime, each nation has its own patent system. This means that 
inventors must satisfy a country’s specific patent laws to obtain a patent, 
sue for infringement in its courts, and obtain remedies available under that 
country’s laws. The proposed worldwide causation theory would undermine 
this regime and allow United States patent law to trump laws in other 
countries. Of course, other countries could follow suit and exercise their 
own forms of “patent imperialism,” thereby wreaking havoc with notions of 
territorial sovereignty in patent law. In addition to causing problems abroad, 
the worldwide causation theory provides troubling disincentives for U.S. 
companies. Companies that locate key activities in the U.S. will be worse 
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off than companies that offshore those activities. In sum, there are ample 
reasons to reject patent imperialism. 
I. PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES 
A. Extraterritorial Limits 
The most common form of patent infringement is direct infringement. 
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act defines a direct infringer as someone who 
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention.”1 It is well established that the reach of § 271(a) is 
limited to infringing activities that occur within the United States.2 
Traditionally, that has meant that patentees can only recover damages 
for infringing products that are made or sold in the United States. For 
example, consider a case from the so-called “smartphone wars.” Recently, a 
jury found that Samsung’s smartphones and tablets infringed a number of 
different Apple patents.3 When arguing over damages, the parties focused 
solely on the products Samsung sold in the United States. Specifically, 
Apple sought a combination of lost profits and reasonable royalties based 
on the sale of 22.7 million infringing tablets and smartphones in the United 
States.4 Notably, Apple did not offer evidence of Samsung’s foreign sales 
nor did it seek damages based on those sales. 
Although there are exceptions to patent law’s territorial limitation, 
these exceptions are narrow. For example, under § 271(g), using a patented 
process to make a product outside the United States can lead to a charge of 
infringement if someone imports the product into the United States or offers 
 
1
  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/ZF74-EBYN]. 
2
  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (“The traditional understanding that 
our patent law ‘operate[s] only domestically and d[oes] not extend to foreign activities,’ is embedded in 
the Patent Act itself, which provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention within the 
United States.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The 
Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 557, 559 (2004))) [http://perma.cc/LG4Q-AFD8]; Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow 
Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (finding patentee not permitted to sue defendants for infringement based 
on drills sold in Canada that later made their way into this country) [http://perma.cc/CW5X-BCD9]. 
3
  Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsung-patent-
trial.html [http://perma.cc/6TJ6-DEFD]. Although the case involved trade dress and design patents, this 
discussion focuses on the utility patent remedies. 
4
  See Transcript of Proceedings at 183, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 
(N.D. Cal. August 21, 2012) (C-11-01846 LHK) (Apple’s closing argument on damages only discussing 
the 22.7 million infringing phones and tablets Samsung sold in the United States.);  Joint Trial Exhibit 
No. 1500, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-CV-
01846-LHK (PSG)) (the parties’ joint exhibit only disclosing Samsung’s U.S. based sales and profit). 
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to sell, sells, or uses the product within the United States.5 Despite the 
statute’s territorial limitation for importing, offering to sell, selling, or 
using, § 271(g) was clearly drafted to encompass foreign conduct––namely, 
using a patented process outside the United States.6 In other situations, the 
courts have interpreted different subsections of § 271(b) to apply to conduct 
abroad. Section 271(b)’s inducement provision does not contain the same 
territorial limitation found in § 271(a).7 Consequently, courts have found 
that conduct outside the United States can qualify as inducement so long as 
the conduct serves to induce some direct infringement inside the United 
States.8 Similarly, courts have occasionally interpreted the location of where 
specific acts of infringement take place very expansively.9 But each of these 
exceptions is tied to particular statutory language and only applies to a very 
narrow set of circumstances.10 
B. Worldwide Causation Theory 
Not surprisingly, patentees have attempted to expand their rights by 
overcoming patent law’s territorial limitations. A new worldwide causation 
based damages theory has now emerged. Patentees are now seeking to 
recover damages based on foreign sales because these sales would not have 
been made “but for” a defendant’s infringing conduct in the United States. 
In Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, the patentee sought 
to recover lost profits for overseas sales made by the accused infringer.11 
 
5
  35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012). 
6
  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 
2139 (2008) (“Absent § 271(g), a competitor could circumvent a U.S. process patent by performing the 
process outside of the United States and importing the unpatented product into the United States.”) 
[hereinafter Holbrook, Extraterritoriality] [http://perma.cc/94XE-QWC7]. 
7
  See generally Bernard Chao, Reconciling Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 80 UMKC L. REV. 
607 (2012) (discussing the unintended consequences of leaving the inducement statute without a 
territorial limitation, but requiring such a limitation for direct and contributory infringement) 
[http://perma.cc/PH33-JXBJ]. 
8
  Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that inducement does not 
have a territorial limitation) [http://perma.cc/5LAY-3A5J]. 
9
  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that an offer made overseas between two U.S. companies to sell an 
infringing product in the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S.) [http://perma.cc/QZC5-UT7R]; 
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that use of an 
infringing system is “where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system 
obtained,” not the physical location of the system) [http://perma.cc/QAR7-49D6]. See generally 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2012) 
[http://perma.cc/KCL2-UZ4T]. 
10
  See generally Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 6 (cataloging the various extraterritorial 
aspects of U.S. patent law). 
11
  Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) [http://perma.cc/Z5GU-8TRN]. 
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Specifically, Power Integrations presented evidence that customers were 
interested in using the same semiconductor chips in their products (power 
supplies for electronic devices) everywhere in the world.12 Consequently, 
the plaintiff, Power Integrations, argued that but for Fairchild’s U.S. 
infringement, Fairchild would not have been able to make its foreign sales; 
Power Integrations would have made those sales.13 Relying on this theory, 
Power Integrations asked for lost profits based on the sales it lost 
worldwide. The Federal Circuit rejected this causation theory, saying that: 
We find neither compelling facts nor a reasonable justification for finding that 
Power Integrations is entitled to “full compensation” in the form of damages 
based on loss of sales in foreign markets which it claims were a foreseeable 
result of infringing conduct in the United States.14 
Notwithstanding the decision in Power Integrations, the worldwide 
causation theory was recently accepted by the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.15 Carnegie Mellon University sued Marvell, a U.S.-based 
semiconductor company, for infringing two patents relating to technology 
that accurately detects data from computer hard-disk drives.16 In December 
2012, Carnegie Mellon prevailed and obtained a $1.17 billion jury verdict.17 
The verdict was based on a fifty cent per chip royalty that was applied to all 
Marvell’s infringing chips sold throughout the world.18 
Unlike those in a typical patent case, Carnegie Mellon’s charges of 
infringement did not focus on the manufacture and sale of Marvell’s 
infringing chips. This is probably because the infringing chips were 
manufactured in Taiwan and then shipped to customer manufacturing sites 
in Asia.19 Instead, the conduct at issue was Marvell’s extensive “sales 
cycle.” This cycle included: 1) “a 3–6 month period of rigorous evaluation 
 
12
  Non-Confidential Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Power Integrations, Inc. at 20, Power 
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 2011-
1218, 2011-1238), 2011 WL 2827447 (“The record shows that Samsung did not make country-specific 
chargers and would not have bought from Fairchild instead of Power Integrations at all if it were unable 
to ship chargers with Fairchild chips into the United States.” (emphasis in original)). 
13
  Id. at 44. 
14
  Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1372. 
15
  Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 638 (W.D. Pa. 2013) 
[http://perma.cc/V28B-XK7P]. 
16
  Id. at 581–82. 
17
  Id. at 582. 
18
  Id. at 597. The court subsequently granted supplemental damages and enhanced the damages by 
1.23 times because of willful infringement. Thus, the total award increased to $1.54 billion. Carnegie 
Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd, No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *26 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 
2014) [http://perma.cc/KB92-638Y]. 
19
  The chips were manufactured at the Taiwan facilities of a foundry belonging to Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 593. Most of Marvell’s 
worldwide semiconductor sales occurred outside the United States and were assembled into products 
abroad before the end products were imported into the United States. Id. at 594. 
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and reliability testing by the customer;” 2) “a 12–18 month development 
period;” and 3) “a 3–6 month period before Marvell commences volume 
production.”20 During the sales cycle, Marvell used simulators “to formulate 
product concepts and to design, refine, and evaluate chip designs.”21 Like 
the end products, the simulators used the technology at issue and were 
accused of infringing the patents.22 More importantly, Carnegie Mellon 
presented evidence that essentially the entire sales cycle took place in Santa 
Clara, California, where Marvell is headquartered.23 Thus, unlike any 
charges that might be brought for making and selling chips abroad, 
§ 271(a)’s territorial limitations did not bar Carnegie Mellon’s accusations 
of infringement against “use” of the patented technology during Marvell’s 
sales cycle.24 
A significant issue with basing allegations of infringement on 
Marvell’s sales cycle was how to determine damages. Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 (2012), prevailing patentees can recover lost profits or, at a minimum, 
a reasonable royalty. As a university, Carnegie Mellon did not make chips 
or compete with Marvell. Thus, there were no lost profits and the only form 
of money damages that Carnegie Mellon could recover was a reasonable 
royalty. In typical patent cases, a reasonable royalty is assessed based on the 
number of infringing products that are made or sold. Since Carnegie 
Mellon’s infringement allegations focused on Marvell’s sales cycle, 
Carnegie Mellon could have sought a royalty based on the number of times 
Marvell simulators used the patented technology during the sales cycle. But 
the court rejected this method because of the difficulty of determining both 
the value of each use and the number of infringing uses.25 
Instead, Carnegie Mellon chose to pursue a worldwide causation 
theory. Specifically, Carnegie Mellon argued that to achieve “design wins” 
Marvell used the patented methods during its sales cycle.26 Since the sales 
cycles caused Marvell’s worldwide sales, Carnegie argued that it was 
 
20
  Id. at 593. 
21
  Id. 
22
  Id. at 592. 
23
  Id. at 593. 
24
  Infringing “uses” are a form of direct infringement under § 271(a), but because end customers 
tend to be responsible for such uses, the issue of infringing use comes up more commonly in cases of 
indirect infringement where companies are accused of contributing to or inducing customers to use 
patented technology. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320–23 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) [http://perma.cc/3FUF-9K8E]. 
25
  Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 636. A royalty could also be based on the number of 
infringing “uses.” However, that is not how damages in patent cases have traditionally been calculated. 
Moreover, the court considered such a methodology and rejected it as impractical. Id. at 635–36. 
26
  Id. at 634–35. 
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entitled to royalty on all those sales.27 The district court accepted the 
worldwide theory, distinguishing Power Integrations on two grounds. 
First, the district court pointed out that the plaintiff in Power 
Integrations was seeking lost profits, not a reasonable royalty.28 Although 
that distinction is factually accurate, the court did not explain why 
reasonable royalty recoveries should contemplate foreign sales, but 
recoveries for lost profits should not. In fact, another district court has 
recently rejected this very distinction, saying, “Power Integrations’s 
occasional reference to ‘lost profits’ is immaterial to the underlying 
principle, which was that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for patent 
infringement that occurred abroad.”29 
The Carnegie Mellon court’s second way of distinguishing Power 
Integrations is equally puzzling. The district court said that unlike Carnegie 
Mellon, the plaintiff in Power Integrations was “seek[ing] ‘damages for 
injury caused by infringing activity that occurred outside the territory of the 
United States.’”30 But the plaintiff in Power Integrations also relied on 
domestic infringement to show foreign damages. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
decision specifically said, “[the plaintiff] argues that it was foreseeable that 
Fairchild’s infringement in the United States would cause Power 
Integrations to lose sales in foreign markets.”31 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected this very theory by saying that 
“the entirely extraterritorial production, use, or sale of an invention patented 
in the United States is an independent, intervening act that, under almost all 
circumstances, cuts off the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic 
infringement.”32 
The Northern District of California is the only other court to address 
the worldwide causation theory after Power Integrations and it also 
interpreted the decision to say that patent law “does not provide damages 
[based on foreign sales] for infringement that originates domestically.”33 
Indeed, the France Telecom court rejected the inclusion of foreign sales 
based on the same Marvell sales cycle, suggesting that Carnegie Mellon 
would have turned out differently had Marvell included certain evidence 
supporting characterization of the sales as foreign.34 Thus, the Carnegie 
 
27
  Id. at 638. 
28
  Id. 
29
  France Telecom S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor Inc., Case No. 12–cv–04967–WHO, 2014 WL 
1478850, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/LM53-YVHA]. 
30
  Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (emphasis in original) (quoting Power Integrations, Inc. 
v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
31
  Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1370 (emphasis added). 
32
  Id. at 1371–72 (emphasis added). 
33
  France Telecom, 2014 WL 1478850, at *14. 
34
  Id. at *17. However, the district court in Carnegie Mellon did appear to understand that Marvell’s 
sales were foreign. See note 19 and accompanying text. 
109:77 (2014) Patent Imperialism 
 83 
Mellon decision plainly fails to follow controlling Federal Circuit 
precedent. 
C. Causation Roots 
To be fair, the worldwide causation theory has some intuitive appeal, 
given its similarity to tort causation analysis.35 Patent law has often 
discussed damages in terms that sound like tort law, in which damages are 
designed to restore the plaintiff to the position it occupied prior to the 
offending conduct. For example, the statute on patent damages describes 
lost profits as providing “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement.”36 Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that when 
calculating damages “that question [is] primarily: had the Infringer not 
infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?”37 Of course, the 
flip side of this kind of analysis is determining what injury the infringer 
“caused.” 
Relying on this kind of tort causation analysis, the Federal Circuit has 
held that patentees can recover damages for the lost sales of both non-
patented and patented products alike.38 To justify this decision, the Federal 
Circuit reasoned that “[i]f a particular injury was or should have been 
reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor in the relevant market, 
broadly defined, that injury is generally compensable absent a persuasive 
reason to the contrary.”39 The worldwide causation theory seeks to extend 
this foreseeability principle to extraterritorial sales. Patentees can often 
point out that a defendant commits infringing acts (most likely “uses”) 
when the design team develops the infringing product in this country or 
when the sales team shows a customer how to use the product in the United 
States. Patentees certainly have the right to seek injunctions to halt those 
 
35
  See Thomas F. Cotter, U.S. District Court Awards Carnegie Mellon $1.5 Billion in Patent 
Damages, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Apr. 21 2014, 4:08 AM), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/04/us-district-court-awards-carnegie.html (initially 
finding Carnegie’s Mellon’s “but for” approach appealing) [http://perma.cc/AKA5-SV6A]. Later, Cotter 
was slightly swayed by the amicus authored by Professor Brian Love in the Carnegie Mellon appeal and 
a draft of this essay. Brief Amici Curiae of Fifteen Professors of Intellectual Property Law in Support of 
Appellant Marvell, Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 2014-1492 (Fed Cir. Aug. 
11, 2014) [http://perma.cc/HVE8-EZGU]; Thomas F. Cotter, Reasonable Royalties Based on 




  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) [http://perma.cc/727E-DZL4]. 
37
  Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958)) 
[http://perma.cc/4ASV-RAWM]. 
38
  Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [http://perma.cc/8GQX-
NHRY]. 
39
  Id. at 1546; see also Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 507. 
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acts. Why can’t they also recover damages for the foreseeable result of 
those infringing acts, namely overseas sales?40 Superficially, the worldwide 
causation theory has some appeal, but the following sections explain why it 
misapplies the law and makes for bad policy. 
II. DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES 
Extending patent damages to losses incurred abroad would violate a 
basic principle of our country’s laws: the presumption against their 
extraterritorial application.41 This presumption is particularly strong in 
patent law,42 where the Supreme Court has noted that “[o]ur patent system 
makes no claim to extraterritorial effect.”43 The Court has even said that 
under the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to enact patent 
laws that extend to foreign commerce.44 
Relying on this presumption, the Supreme Court has refused to extend 
U.S. patent law to circumstances that look very similar to those in Power 
Integrations and Carnegie Mellon. In Microsoft v. AT&T, Microsoft had 
been sending Windows operating systems to foreign computer 
manufacturers by email or by sending a master disk.45 AT&T alleged that 
computers equipped with Windows infringed its patent for digitally 
encoding and compressing recorded speech.46 Even though the computers 
were made abroad, AT&T argued that Microsoft was liable under § 271(f) 
 
40
  Commentators, including this one, have criticized this kind of “but for” analysis as antithetical to 
patent law’s goal of maximizing innovation. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1397 (2014) (“By focusing on restoring patentees to the position they had 
prior to any infringement, patent remedies often ignore the public’s interest in encouraging innovation 
that builds on existing patented technology.”) [http://perma.cc/7LW6-BJSD]; Ted Sichelman, Purging 
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 536 (2014) (“[The] problem . . . is that 
the private law remedies usually associated with tort law—injunctions and compensatory damages—are 
not always sensible for optimally encouraging innovation.”) [http://perma.cc/MSV5-YZY2]. 
41
  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he presumption against 
extraterritorial application . . . provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.’” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 
255 (2010))) [http://perma.cc/UQ7A-GCNM]. 
42
  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United 
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent 
law.”). 
43
  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) [http://perma.cc/5X56-
JM6K]. 
44
  Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (“The power [from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8] 
thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of the United States. 
It confers no power on Congress to regulate commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a 
foreign nation, and occasionally visit our ports in their commercial pursuits”) [http://perma.cc/8JVL-
B3KV]. 
45
  Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441. 
46
  Id. at 441–42. 
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for supplying components of a patented invention from the United States.47 
The Supreme Court rejected AT&T’s theory and held that Microsoft was 
not “supplying components” because only copies of Microsoft’s software 
were being loaded into the computers.48 One important reason underlying 
the Court’s decision was the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. patent laws.49 In short, the Supreme Court interpreted 
U.S. patent law so that it would not encompass foreign activity even when 
that activity stemmed from domestic conduct (i.e. supplying a master disk). 
Although AT&T relied on § 271(f) to sue Microsoft, it could have just 
as well pursued a worldwide causation theory. After all, Microsoft is based 
in Redmond, Washington and develops much of its software there. 
Presumably, Microsoft performed exhaustive tests on Windows loaded on 
computers in the United States. Such testing would have been an infringing 
“use” under § 271(a). Moreover, it was clearly foreseeable that successful 
infringing tests would eventually lead to Microsoft’s foreign sales. 
The fact that AT&T did not even raise the worldwide causation theory 
is quite telling. First, it demonstrates that recovering extraterritorial 
damages has not been part of patent law. Clearly, attorneys as capable as 
AT&T’s would have raised the potentially lucrative worldwide causation 
theory if the theory had been adopted previously. Second, AT&T’s 
omission also suggests that the worldwide causation theory had a smaller 
chance of success than the interpretation of § 271(f) that AT&T did 
advance. The Supreme Court has said that Congress must provide a “clear 
and certain signal” before expanding patent statutes wider than courts had 
previously thought.50 AT&T was at least able to point to some statutory 
language in § 271(f) that said that supplying components from the United 
States was infringement. In contrast, the worldwide causation theory cannot 
point to any statute that suggests that Congress intended to extend damages 
extraterritorially. Indeed, Carnegie Mellon relied chiefly on Powell v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., a decision that discusses reasonable royalty calculations 
without discussing extraterritorial effects.51 Thus, like AT&T’s rejected 
 
47
  Id. at 442. 
48
  Id. at 453 (“Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components ‘from the United States . . . in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.’ Under this formulation, the very 
components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when 
combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.” (emphasis in original)). 
49
  Id. at 454 (“Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be 
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).  
50
  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). 
51
  See Plaintiff Carnegie Mellon University’s Opposition to Marvell’s Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law, New Trial and/or Remittitur with Respect to Damages at 4, Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. 
Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 2:09-cv-00290-NBF), 2013 WL 
3810532 (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
a jury may calculate royalties based on the benefit conferred)). 
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interpretation of § 271(f), the worldwide causation theory attempts to 
dramatically expand the extraterritorial reach of patent law in a way that 
courts have not done before. But since there is no “clear and certain signal” 
from Congress endorsing such an approach, the courts do not have the 
discretion to adopt that theory now. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY 
A. Violating Principles of International Comity 
The case against the worldwide causation theory does not rely on 
doctrinal grounds alone. Such an expansion of U.S. patent law is troubling 
from both international and domestic policy perspectives. Principles of 
international comity suggest that the United States should not dictate how 
other countries’ patent systems operate. Under the present international 
patent regime, each country issues and enforces its own patents.52 Indeed, 
the preamble of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) recognizes the need to provide for the “effective 
and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual 
property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems.”53 
If adopted, the worldwide causation theory would undermine the 
international system of national patents and lead to a type of U.S. patent 
imperialism. Many commentators (including this one) already believe that 
U.S. law systematically overcompensates patentees.54 Not surprisingly, 
other prominent foreign countries provide smaller monetary awards for 
patent infringement.55 But the worldwide causation theory will allow 
patentees to take advantage of U.S. patent law to avoid a foreign country’s 
 
52
  Martin J. Adelman, Shubha Ghosh, Amy Landers & Toshiko Takenaka, Global Issues in Patent 
Law 1 (2011) (“A patent is a creature of national law, and an inventor seeking worldwide protection for 
her creation would have to obtain a patent in every country that offers patent protection.”). 
53
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(having 160 signatories) (emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/Z64T-T56T]; see also Holbrook, 
Extraterritoriality, supra note 6 at 2160–61 (“Although TRIPS has afforded a certain level of 
harmonization, it still grants flexibility for countries to afford higher protection or to exclude protection 
for certain inventions.”). 
54
  See, e.g., Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 102–07 
(2012) [http://perma.cc/NJ63-E2EY]; Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a 
Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909 passim (2009) [http://perma.cc/VZ3B-QBYJ]. 
55
  Toshiko Takenaka, Success or Failure? Japan’s National Strategy on Intellectual Property and 
Evaluation of Its Impact from the Comparative Law Perspective, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
379, 393 (2009) (discussing the huge gap between patent damages in Japan and the United States) 
[http://perma.cc/J2GR-J56U]. In Germany, punitive damages are not allowed for willful infringement. 
Moreover, a court can limit damages owed by an infringer who acts with only negligence to an amount 
between the actual damages suffered and the gain achieved. Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in 
American and German Law—Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable 
Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 105, 139 (2003) [http://perma.cc/UYG2-J5SZ]. 
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more limited remedies. In fact, companies will not even need to obtain 
patent coverage in those countries. Companies will be able seek damages 
based on U.S. law against products made and sold abroad by asserting U.S. 
patents and suing in U.S. courts. This will be true even if the other country 
has refused to award a patent for a particular invention and has consciously 
chosen to provide more modest recoveries to those that are awarded patents 
there. 
Clearly, the United States would be extremely upset if the 
circumstances were reversed and another country tried to impose its patent 
values on products made and sold in the U.S. U.S. law may not match up 
well with the patent law of other countries. For example, just recently, the 
United States Supreme Court declared that many software patents are no 
longer patent eligible.56 Imagine if Japan issued such a patent to a company 
that used Japanese courts to recover damages on software designed in 
Japan, but made and sold in the United States. The United States would 
view this as impermissible interference with U.S. patent law. But that is just 
what the Carnegie Mellon decision does in reverse; it allows U.S. patent 
law to trump the patent laws of other countries for activity that takes place 
in those countries. 
This result would violate principles of comity that are already 
embedded in U.S. law. The Supreme Court has said that statutes should be 
interpreted to ensure that “potentially conflicting laws of different nations 
work together in harmony.”57 In practice that means each nation should 
“respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its 
laws and their enforcement.”58 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States Section 403(1) (1986) even suggests 
that where there is jurisdiction, a state may not exercise that jurisdiction 
unreasonably.59 Here, there is no good reason to substitute U.S. patent law 
for the patent law of another country.60 In sum, the worldwide causation 
 
56
  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) [http://perma.cc/K7AP-4NHB]. 
Determining what kind of software patents are eligible remains a formidable task. See Rob Merges, 
Symposium: Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 
2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-
after-alice-v-cls-bank/ [http://perma.cc/33ZD-LSCU]. 
57
  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) [http://perma.cc/79VT-
69XN]. 
58
  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
[http://perma.cc/U2NX-DEQG]. 
59
  Section 403 then goes on to provide a list of factors to evaluate reasonableness including 
territorial links, nationality links, infringing on other countries interests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1986) [http://perma.cc/KWN2-DDUK]. 
60
  Comity principles might not be helpful if Marvell’s sales were made to purchasers in a country 
that does not have a functioning patent system. However, Carnegie Mellon sought to recover damages 
for all overseas sales originating in the U.S. regardless of where the sales consummated. 
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theory leads to results that are inconsistent with basic notions of 
international comity. 
B. Harming Domestic Industry 
Now of course the worldwide causation theory has limits to its 
applicability. To invoke the theory, there must be some infringing activity 
inside the United States that “causes” sales abroad. But this limitation 
actually means that U.S. patent law will treat U.S.-based companies worse 
than foreign companies. Typically, the domestic infringing activity will be 
designing and testing products domestically or, as in the case of Marvell, 
having the “sales cycle” take place within the United States.61 Such 
activities are likely to be infringing “uses” under § 271(a). But if a 
company’s research, development and “sales cycle” take place abroad, there 
will be no domestic infringing activity that can be said to “cause” foreign 
sales. Accordingly, foreign-based companies will be immune from U.S. 
patent holders seeking to capture damages based on foreign sales. 
This disparate treatment provides troubling incentives for companies 
that conduct their affairs in the United States.62 Keep your key activities in 
the United States and subject yourself to aggressive patent holders and 
worldwide damages. Alternatively, move abroad and limit your liability 
accordingly. Doubtless many companies will remain in the United States to 
take advantage of its entrepreneurial ecosystem. But some companies are 
already moving offshore for competitive reasons outside of patent law. For 
example, semiconductor companies like Marvell have already offshored 
much of their key activities. Most U.S. semiconductor companies now 
manufacture their chips outside the United States.63 Some companies, like 
Intel, have simply moved their manufacturing facilities abroad to take 
advantage of lower-cost labor.64 Other companies, like Qualcomm, 
Broadcom, and NVIDIA, have actually outsourced their manufacturing to 
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  See supra text accompanying notes 20 to 22. 
62
  See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect 
Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2004) (discussing how differences in national intellectual 
property rules can cause economic activity to shift from one jurisdiction to another) 
[http://perma.cc/34BP-Z2WK]. 
63
  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-423, OFFSHORING: U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR 
AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES INCREASINGLY PRODUCE IN CHINA AND INDIA 29 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 
OFFSHORING REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06423.pdf (“The decline in U.S. 
semiconductor imports since 2000 reflects the movement from the United States to Asia of 
manufacturing production of electronics products that use integrated circuits. Finished integrated circuits 
are moving to other countries in Asia, particularly China, for assembly into electronics products, rather 
than returning to the United States.”) [http://perma.cc/S2MW-XPBK]. 
64
  The GAO notes that “[a]lthough a lower labor cost was initially a key factor that attracted firms 
to offshore locations, other factors such as technological advances, available skilled workers, and 
foreign government policy, also played roles.” Id. at pmbl. 
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semiconductor “foundries.”65 Since product companies generally assemble 
their products abroad in countries like China, the semiconductor sales 
usually take place abroad as well.66 Given a sufficiently hostile patent 
environment, companies may well decide to move their research, 
development and sales facilities offshore as well.67 There is precedent for 
such patent law-motivated moves. In 2012, Microsoft moved its European 
distribution center from Germany to the Netherlands rather than risk an 
injunction in Germany that would affect its ability to serve other markets.68 
The worldwide causation theory has the potential to have a similar 
impact. In both Power Integrations and Carnegie Mellon, the theory 
expanded damages drastically. In Power Integrations, there was evidence 
suggesting that 18% of Fairchild’s semiconductor chips at issue found 
themselves in products imported into the United States and 82% remained 
abroad.69 If these numbers were correct, Power Integration stood to recover 
over five times the lost profits it would have recovered under a more 
traditional domestic-based damages theory.70 
The worldwide causation theory had a similar impact on the Carnegie 
Mellon result. The jury verdict of $1,169,140,271 was calculated using a 
$.50/chip royalty on 2,338,280,542 chips.71 But apparently a large majority 
of those chips were sold and used overseas. If damages had been calculated 
based on the smaller United States royalty base, they would have ranged 
from $164,648,899 to $278,406,045.50 reducing damages by 85.9% to 
76.2%.72 Thus, to date, the worldwide causation theory has proven to 
multiply damages several times. It is simply bad policy for the United 
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  JEORGE S. HURTARTE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FABLESS IC TECHNOLOGY 8 (2007). Prominent 
U.S. semiconductor foundries include Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and 
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) in Taiwan, Chartered Semiconductor in Singapore, and 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in China. Id. at 11. 
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  See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 63, at 29 (“The decline in U.S. semiconductor 
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electronics products that use integrated circuits.”). 
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  Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from 
Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (1997) (criticizing the enactment of § 271(f) for incentivizing 
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  Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, 711 F.3d 1348, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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  However, Fairchild successfully challenged these figures as unreliable. Id. at 1374–76. 
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  Marvell’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, New Trial 
and/or Remittitur with Respect to Damages at 3, Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 
F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 2:09-cv-00290-NBF), 2013 WL 1889517. 
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  Id. at 21. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 90 
States to force their own companies to endure such exposure when 
companies with foreign facilities do not. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Patent holders are pressing for an unprecedented expansion of U.S. 
patent law by seeking to recover damages based on foreign sales. This 
worldwide causation theory represents a dangerous turn that has the 
potential to disrupt the international patent system and harm domestic 
industry. Although the Federal Circuit has already rejected the theory once 
in Power Integrations, Carnegie Mellon University was able to obtain an 
unprecedented $1.17 billion verdict (now enhanced to $1.54 billion) relying 
on this theory. The decision is currently being appealed. Relying on both 
basic patent law doctrine and sound public policy, the Federal Circuit 
should reverse the damages portion of that decision and quash the 
worldwide causation theory for good. U.S. patent holders should not be able 
to recover for damages for the sale of infringing products sold abroad. 
Foreign damages should be left to the foreign courts enforcing foreign 
patents. 
 
